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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Case No. 20150832-CA 
CHANCE ARIC NAVARRO, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4- l 03(2)( e ). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did police impermissibly exploit the traffic stop for the purpose of 
investigating suspicions unrelated to the circumstances which rendered the initiation of 
the traffic stop pennissible? 
Standard of review: On review of criminal proceedings, the court of 
appeals accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 
However, the appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts. State 
v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, 18, 182 P.3d 935. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ST A TUTES, AND RULES 
Photocopies of the district court's handwritten ruling and the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress are included in the 
ADDENDUM. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Washington County, John J. Walton presiding. R 128-134. The 
only issue on appeal concerns whether or not the district court erred in denying 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle. 
Proceedings in the Lower Court. Defendant was charged with two counts of 
POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a 3rd degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-10-503(3)(a); one count of POSSESSION OR USE 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a 3rd degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); one count of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 
58-37a-5( 1 ); and one count of ILLEGAL WINDOW TINTING, a class C misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-1635. R 1-2. Defendant moved the district 
court to suppress the alleged controlled substance and drug paraphernalia, as well as the 
2 
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two firearms in question. R 19-20, 43-53. The district court denied Defendant's motion 
and the matter was tried to a jury. R 59-60. 
Disposition in the Trial Court. At trial, the State failed to present evidence supporting 
the charge of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE and 
abandoned the charge of ILLEGAL WINDOW TINTING. Those charges were not 
submitted to the jury. R 87-107. The two counts of POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY 
RESTRICTED PERSON were sent to the jury on the theory that the defendant was a 
restricted person because he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. See Jury 
Instruction Nos. 12A and 12C. R 98, 100. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the two 
counts of POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY RESTRICTED PERSON and the single 
count of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. R 108-109. 
Defendant was sentenced to two indetenninate terms not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison and pay a fine in the amount of $5,000.00, plus a 90% surcharge, and a court 
security fee of$33.00 on each of the felony convictions. He was sentenced to 180 days in 
the Washington County Purgatory Correctional Facility and pay a fine in the amount of 
$1,000.00, plus a 90% surcharge, and a court security fee of $33.00 on the misdemeanor 
conviction. The district court stayed the execution of these sentences and placed 
Defendant on supervised probation for a period of 36 months upon terms and conditions 
which included 60 days incarceration in the Washington County Purgatory Correctional 
Facility with credit for 30 days previously served. R 128-132. 
3 
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Statement of Facts. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on the evening of August I, 2013, 
detectives with the Washington County Drug Task Force began conducting surveillance of 
a business known as Young's Tire Service located at 405 Park Street in St. George, Utah. 
R 137, at 5, 7, 8-9, 35. The officers were attempting to locate one Travis Farnsworth for 
whom they had recently obtained an arrest warrant. R 137, at 4-5, 8, 35. 
Sergeant Jared Parry observed one Daniel Cooney working in a garage on 
the business premises. R 13 7, at 9, 11. During the surveillance, several other individuals 
arrived or were already on the premises. R 137, at 9, 19, 25-26. However, Travis 
Farnsworth was never observed on the premises on the evening in question. R 137, at 35-
36. 
Another member of the task force, Detective Jason Jarvey, observed the 
defendant arrive in a green Chevrolet Tahoe and enter the business. R 13 7, at I 0, 72-73. 
Defendant was not a target of the investigation and officers were not looking for him on 
the evening in question. R 13 7, at 5. 
At about I 0:55 p.m., Sergeant Parry observed Daniel Cooney put what 
appeared to be a white pipe to his mouth and smoke from it. Cooney exhaled 
"white-colored smoke", paused briefly, and then exhaled again. Based upon his training 
and experience, Parry suspected that Cooney was smoking ··some kind of illegal 
substance." R 137, at 9, 14-15. 
Later, Sergeant Parry observed the defendant exit the business and approach 
the green Tahoe. R 137, at 11. Parry testified that he was using binoculars and recognized 
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the defendant and further testified that he was "very confident" that the tint on defendant's 
window exceeded the legal limit. R 13 7, at 1 L 16- I 8. 
At approximately 11 :20 p.m., the defendant again approached the Tahoe, 
opened the driver's side rear door, retrieved a pair of binoculars, and scanned the area 
around the business. R 137, at 19-20. Shortly thereafter, the defendant opened the rear 
hatch of the Tahoe and began to rummage through the contents. With the hatch open, 
Sergeant Parry could see what appeared to be a rifle case in the rear compartment. R 13 7, 
at 20-21. 
Sergeant Parry had been involved in the investigation and prosecution of a 
case against the defendant several years earlier that had "involved a decent amount of 
marijuana as well as a handgun.'· R 137, at 22. He had personal knowledge that the 
defendant pied guilty to a felony charge in that case. R 137. at 21-22, 43-44. Sergeant 
Parry thought that if what appeared to him to be a rifle case actually contained a firearm, 
the defendant may be violating the law that denies a felon the right to possess a firearm. R 
137, at 21-22, 43-44. 
At 11 :39 p.m., the defendant backed the Tahoe out of the Young's Tire 
Service parking lot, and together with three other vehicles, left the area traveling toward 
350 North. R 137, at 25-26, 46. Sergeant Parry radioed his observations regarding 
defendant's illegal window tint. R 137, at 27. Under questioning by the State's 
prosecutor, Sergeant Parry testified that the task force had "detectives who were mobile in 
5 
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cars waiting to apprehend" the individuals who were leaving the business premises. R 
137, at 26-27. In Sergeant Parry's words: 
Q [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Basically the only thing that 
you identified for fellow officers that you believed would be 
the basis for a stop was the window tint violation; is that a fair 
statement? And you told them to use caution. 
A [BY SERGEANT PARRY] As far as -- to answer your 
question, I mean, I believe this investigation was very 
pretextual. There's other information involved. The window 
tint violation certainly played into it. It would be a valid 
reason to make a traffic stop given the fireanns case or any 
other reason, I mean, setting that all aside. 
R 137, at 44-45. 
Detectives Jim Jessop and Nick Nuccitelli, who were working with the drug 
task force, heard Sergeant Parry state over the radio that caution should be used in 
approaching the defendant because the defendant had allegedly made statements to some 
infonnant suggesting that the defendant was armed and prepared to resist the police with 
deadly force. R 137, at 27-28. Parry further cautioned fellow officers that the defendant 
possibly had a rifle case in his vehicle. R 13 7, at 40, 73. 
Detectives Jessop and Nuccitelli observed the four vehicles tum into the 
parking lot of the Wendy's restaurant on 1000 East. R 137, at 75. The detectives parked 
across the street in the Denny's parking lot. They observed one of the vehicles go through 
the Wendy's drive-thru and meet back up with the other three vehicles. R 137, at 75-76. 
The defendanf s vehicle and a black passenger car then traveled from the Wendy's to the 
Denny's parking lot about a block north, where they parked side-by-side. R 137, at 76-79. 
6 
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Detective Jessop, who was one of the officers that initiated the stop, 
identified the window tint violation as the legal basis for stopping the defendant. R 13 7, at 
73. Jessop and Nuccitelli confirmed, by their own observations, that the tint on the 
driver's window of the defendant's vehicle clearly appeared to exceed the legal limit. R 
137, at 77-78. Under questioning by the State's prosecutor, Detective Jessop testified as 
follows: 
R 137, at 78. 
Q [BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR] Was it even a close 
call for you whether that was too dark? 
A [BY DETECTIVE JESSOP] Not even borderline. Once in 
a while you run -- I've ran into situations where I feel like it's 
probably borderline, and thaf s not one of those situations. 
Detective Jessop testified that it was Detective Nuccitelli who actually 
activated the red and blue lights, but Jessop understood that Hwe were trying to make a 
~ stop on all of the vehicles." R 137, at 78-79. 
When the driver of the black passenger car exited her vehicle and began 
"quickly walking towards Denny's,'' the detectives approached her and ordered her to get 
on the ground. R 13 7, at 79. They then approached the defendant's vehicle with their 
service weapons drawn. R 137, at 97-98. Detective Jessop approached on the passenger's 
side and ordered him to show his hands. R 137, at 80-81. The defendant's right hand was 
visible, but his left hand \:\/as out of view. Detective Nuccitelli, who had approached on 
the driver's side of the defendant's vehicle, also ordered the defendant to show his hands. 
The defendant took approximately five seconds to comply. R 137, at 98. 
7 
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It is apparent that the ··traffic stop'" in question was initiated sometime 
between 11 :42 p.m. and 11 :45 p.m. 1 
The detectives opened defendant's car door, ordered him out of the vehicle, 
and frisked him for weapons. R 137, at 82. The defendant said he had a knife, and the 
detectives recovered a fixed blade knife in a sheath from his person. R 137, at 82-83. 
They sat the defendant on the ground away from his vehicle. Detective Jessop never 
advised dispatch that he was out on a traffic stop. R 13 7, at 89. After the officers had the 
defendant in handcuffs, Jessop ""mentioned to him ... that his windows were dark, and they 
were too dark." R 137, at 83-84. Jessop did not ask the defendant to produce a driver 
license, vehicle registration. or proof of insurance. R 13 7, at 89-92, 98-99. In fact, 
Detective Jessop testified that at no time during the entire course of the '~traffic stop" did 
he ascertain whether or not defendant's vehicle was registered or insured. R 137, at 98-99. 
Detective Nuccitelli never advised dispatch that he was out on a traffic stop. 
R 137, at 115. Nuccitelli testified that he did not remember ifhe or any other officer had 
ever asked the defendant for a driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. R 
1The dispatch log does not pinpoint the time because apparently none of the officers 
advised dispatch that the drug task force was out with a member of the public. R 13 7, at 
62-63. We know that the defendant lefl Young's Tire Service at 11 :39 p.m. R 13 7, at 25-26. 
The Denny's parking lot was about •'three or four blocks'' from Young's Tire Service. R 
13 7, at 29. When asked if he recalled how long it was from the time he observed the 
defendant leave Young's Tire Service until he was advised by radio that officers had stopped 
the defendant, Sergeant Parry testified that he did not keep track of those times. The 
prosecutor then asked if it was "'[l]ike three or four minutes, five or six minutes/' Parry 
testified: '"You know, it would be a guess. It was a few minutes." R 137, at 28. 
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137, at 116-17. Nuccitelli did not call for a window tint meter and did not remember when 
a tint meter arrived on scene. R 13 7, at 118-1 9. 
Police officers stopped three of the four vehicles that had left Young's Tire 
Service and, with the task force's drug-sniffing dog, descended upon the vehicles, one 
after another. R 137, at 46-48. 
When Sergeant Parry arrived at the Denny's parking lot, he advised the 
defendant that he had been stopped for a window tint violation. R 137, at 29. Upon 
approaching the defendant following the stop, the window tint violation was the only 
public offense that Parry identified as a basis for stopping the defendant's vehicle. R 13 7, 
at 61. Parry did not contact dispatch to make them aware that officers were out on a 
traffic stop. R 137, at 61. He did not know if any other officer had advised dispatch. R 
137, at 61-62. He could not testify, based upon anything he saw or heard, that any police 
officer ever contacted dispatch to advise them that the drug task force was out with a 
member of the public.2 R 137, at 62-63. Parry further testified that, to his knowledge, no 
law enforcement officer ever asked the defendant to produce a driver license, vehicle 
registration, or proof of insurance. R 13 7, at 63-64. 
Sergeant Parry testified that "during that stop at some point ... Lieutenant 
Feldner ... had either a laptop computer or something" and officers "were able to run his 
2The police radio log, that was admitted into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit No. I, 
contains no entry suggesting that any one of the task force officers had ever radioed the 
dispatcher. 
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criminal history, and at that point in time I found that [the defendant] wasn't a felon." R 
137, at 65. 
Sergeant Parry testified that he called Detective Matt Schuman, the task 
force K-9 handler, at 12:03 a.m. R 137, at 32-34. On the other hand, Parry could not 
remember ifhe ever requested a tint meter. R 137, at 30. 
Q [BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR] And while you were 
with Mr. Navarro, you said you talked to him about the 
window tint violation. Did you request a tint meter to be 
brought to the location? 
A [BY SERGEANT PARRY] I can't remember if it was me 
that requested it or not. One did come. Somebody had 
requested one. It very well could have been me. It would 
make sense. 
R 137, at 29-30. 
While no officer made any inquiry concerning the defendant's driver license, 
vehicle registration, or insurance, a tint meter would eventually be brought to the location. 
R 13 7, at 84-85. When Sergeant Parry was asked what time the tint meter arrived on the 
scene~ the following exchange takes place: 
Q [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] At what point in time did the 
tint meter arrive on scene? 
A [BY SERGEANT PARRY] Sometime before midnight 
twelve. I'm not sure ,:vhat time. I will have no way of 
knowing. 
THE COURT: How about in relation to when the K-9 unit 
arrived? Do you remember which arrived first? 
THE WITNESS: I don't. I don't. However -- I don't. I'm 
not sure. 
10 
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R 137, at 69. 
Detective Jim Jessop testified that -~sergeant Sprigg is the one that showed 
up with the tint meter." R 137, at 84-85. Jessop testified that he remembered that the tint 
meter arrived "after the dog," but he could not identify the officer who called for the tint 
meter and did not indicate at what point in time the meter was requested. R 13 7, at 96-97. 
After Detective Schuman arrived, a K-9 sniff was conducted on the exterior 
of the defendant's vehicle. R 137, at 48-49. When the K-9 allegedly alerted on 
defendant's vehicle, a search of the defendant's vehicle was conducted. R 137, at 34-35, 
49. 
In the course of that warrantless search, police allegedly seized a small 
quantity of suspected methamphetamine and two firearms which lead to the charges 
herein. R 1-2. After being bound over for trial, the defendant moved the court for an 
order suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search on the 
grounds that the police had impermissibly exploited the traffic stop. R 19-20, 43-53. The 
district court denied defendant's motion, concluding that "the stop of defendant's vehicle 
for a window tint violation was constitutional at its inception" and that '"both a tint meter 
and a K-9 unit were requested shortly after the stop, and that the tint meter did not arrive 
until after the arrival of the K-9 unit.'' R 59-60. Finally, the district court concluded: 
"Once the K-9 alerted on the defendant's vehicle, the detectives had reasonable suspicion 
of additional serious criminal activity, and could appropriately expand the investigative 
scope of the initial stop." R 59-60. 
11 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only legal basis for the stop in question was the observation of an 
equipment violation. The police did nothing typically associated with conducting a routine 
traffic stop. The evidence that the State offered in support of this warrantless search fails 
to demonstrate that task force officers took any measures to clear the traffic stop before 
embarking upon their narcotics investigation. Indeed, the record does not demonstrate that 
officers took any measures to clear the traffic stop before concluding their narcotics 
investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CONCEDES THAT POLICE OFFICERS' 
SUBJECTIVE MOTIVES IN INITIATING A TRAFFIC 
STOP ARE IRRELEVANT. 
"A traffic stop is justified at its inception if an officer has (1) probable cause 
to believe a traffic violation has occurred, or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that a 
particular motorist has violated any of the traffic or equipment regulations of the 
jurisdiction." United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.2009). ·"[T]he 
government need not show a violation actually occurred to justify an initial traffic stop." 
United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998). The courts look only at 
whether the stop was objectively justified. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F .3d 783, 
787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en bane). 
12 
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In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that, if reasonable in scope and duration, a traffic stop based upon reasonable suspicion 
that the driver has violated any applicable traffic or equipment regulation does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, even if the stop is in fact undertaken as a pretext for the 
investigation of some other offense unrelated to the observed violation. Lopez, 873 P .2d at 
1132.3 
In rejecting the pretext stop doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
fact that if the police, by simply articulating some legitimate basis for initiating the stop, 
were going to be permitted to initiate traffic stops in the interest of investigating subjective 
suspicions, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures could only be 
enforced by prohibiting any detention that is longer than necessary to effectuate the 
legitimate purpose of the stop and by making certain that both the length and the scope of 
the detention are "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation pennissible." Id., emphasis added. 
31n the years preceding the Lopez decision, the Utah Court of Appeals had adopted what 
was commonly referred to as the "pretext doctrine" which was applied in cases where police 
claimed to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court 
detennined the stop was actually motivated by a desire to investigate something concerning 
which there was no reasonable suspicion. See State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 135-37 (Utah 
App.1991 ); State v. Marshall, 791 P .2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P .2d 1105 
(Utah 1990); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216-17 (UtahApp.1988); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). 
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POINT II 
DRUG TASK FORCE OFFICERS IMPERMISSIBL Y 
EXPLOITED THE TRAFFIC STOP. 
Traffic Stops and Dog Sniffs in General. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 
834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), the United State Supreme Court held that a dog sniff 
conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment's 
proscription of unreasonable seizures. However, in Rodriguez v. United States, _U.S. 
_, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop 
that "exceed[ s] the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates 
the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures" and that "[a] seizure justified only 
by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, 'become[ s] unlawful if it is prolonged 
beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[ e] mission' of issuing a ticket for the 
violation." Rodriguez, 191 L.Ed.2d at 496 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Cf State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (requiring that both the length and the scope of the detention be 
"'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
pennissible. "). 
Rodriguez explained that a "dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the 
officer's traffic mission." 191 L.Ed.2d at 499. A dog sniff that prolongs the stop beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the traffic 
offense violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures unless the officer 
has independent reasonable suspicion to support such a prolongation. Id. at 496. 
Rodriguez held "'the Government's endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking 
14 
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in particular" cannot justify prolonging an ordinary traffic stop to conduct a canine 
narcotics investigation. Id. at 500. Such ··[ o ]n-scene investigation into other crimes ... 
detours" from an officer's traffic mission. Id. 
In the instant case, the State contends that the K-9 sniff did not extend the 
defendant's detention because police had not completed the "mission" of the traffic stop 
prior to the K-9 sniff, contending that the tint meter had not been brought to the location of 
the traffic stop when the drug-sniffing dog arrived on scene. 
Task Force Officers Never Treated the Subject Encounter as a Traffic Stop. From its 
outset, task force officers treated the so-called traffic stop as a felony stop. The officers 
approached the defendant's vehicle with their service weapons drawn. R 137, at 97-98. 
They opened defendant's car door, ordered him out of the vehicle, and frisked him for 
weapons. R 137, at 82. They sat the defendant on the ground away from his vehicle. 
Sergeant Parry acknowledged that he was familiar with traffic-stop protocol 
taught as part of the Peace Officer Standards and Training course and agreed that the 
protocol includes advising the dispatcher that the officer is out with a civilian. R 13 7, at 
54. Parry conceded that this part of the established routine was for officer safety and that 
it also advised the dispatcher that the officer is out of his vehicle and in contact with a 
member of the public. R 13 7, at 54. Sergeant Parry further acknowledged that, in 
initiating a traffic stop, an officer has the right and a duty to identify the driver by driver's 
license. R 137, at 57-58. Parry also agreed that part of the protocol was to request vehicle 
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registration and proof of insurance. R 137, at 58. Detective Jessop likewise testified that 
he was familiar with this protocol. R 13 7, at 89. 
We know that the stop was initiated at approximately 11 :45 p.m. R 13 7, at 
25-26, 28-29, 62-63. None of the officers advised the dispatcher upon the initiation of the 
stop. R 137, at 61-63, 89, 115. None of the officers asked the defendant to produce his 
driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. R 13 7, at 61-64, 89-92, 98-99, 
115-117. 
Police Reports Document Only Events Associated with the Narcotics Investigation. 
Sergeant Parry called for the K-9 unit at 12:03 a.m. R 137, at 32-34. We know that the K-
9 unit arrived and had finished the sniff by 12:12 a.m. R 137, at 33-34. On the other 
hand, while we know that a tint meter was eventually brought to the location of the stop, 
we do not know who, if anyone, requested it. R 13 7, at 30. More importantly, we do not 
know when it was requested. Indeed, the only evidence that sheds any light on the 
question of whether a tint meter was requested before the officers were "detoured" by the 
activities associated with the advancement of their narcotics investigation was Sergeant 
Parry's testimony suggesting that the tint meter arrived on scene at ··[s]ometime before 
midnight twelve,'' which would have been at least three minutes before the K-9 was even 
summoned. R 137., at 69. 
Assuming that one of the task force officers actually called for a tint meter, it 
is not clear that the call was made before Sergeant Parry called for the K-9 unit or even 
that the call for a tint meter was made before the task force had completed its narcotics 
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investigation. R 137, at 29-30, 69, 96-97, 118-119. On the other hand, it is undisputed 
that during the time intervening between the stop and summoning of the K-9 unit, no 
officer did anything typically associated with the clearing of a traffic stop. R 13 7, at 61-
64, 89-92, 98-99, 115-117. Indeed, there is no evidence that any officer, at anytime during 
the entire encounter, ever required the defendant to produce a driver license, vehicle 
registration, or proof of insurance. 
Nothing about the Pretext Stop Resembled a Traffic Stop. Defendant contends that if 
the police are going to be able to conduct pretext stops, the pretense of making a traffic 
stop must extend beyond the initiation of the stop and the encounter must, on some level, 
resemble a traffic stop. 
Defendant further contends that if the police are going to be able to advance 
the argument that they did not extend the duration of the defendant's detention because a 
tint meter was not brought to the scene until after their drug investigation had developed 
probable cause to search the defendanf s vehicle, they must, at a minimum, be required to 
demonstrate that they took reasonable measures to prosecute the investigation of the traffic 
violation before they embarked upon the detour into the investigation of the suspicions that 
actually motivated the stop. In other words, even if the tint meter did not arrive on scene 
until after the K-9 sniff, that fact would really mean nothing without evidence 
demonstrating that a tint meter was at least requested before task force officers were 
"detoured" by their desire to investigate their subjective suspicions. 
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In the instant case, there is no evidence that any call for a tint meter was 
made before the K-9 unit was summoned. Indeed, it is not clear that any call for a tint 
meter was made before task force officers had concluded their narcotics investigation. R 
137, at 29-30, 69, 96-97, 118-119. 
Defendant acknowledges that the district court made a finding that "both a 
tint meter and a K-9 unit were requested shortly after the stop, and that the tint meter did 
not arrive until after the arrival of the K-9 unit.'' R 59-60. Defendant concedes that it was 
within the district court's prerogative to reject Sergeant Parry's recollection concerning the 
time of the arrival of the tint meter in relationship to the arrival of the K-9 unit (R 137, at 
69) and to embrace Detective Jessop·s memory of those events (R 137, at 96-97). 
However, the finding that "both a tint meter and a K-9 unit were requested shortly after the 
stop" is not supported by evidence. 
The best evidence concerning when and whether officers call for a tint meter 
is found in the prosecutor's direct examination of Sergeant Parry: 
Q [BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR] And while you were 
with Mr. Navarro, you said you talked to him about the 
windmv tint violation. Did you request a tint meter to be 
brought to the location? 
A [BY SERGEANT PARRY] I can't remember if it was me 
that requested it or not. One did come. Somebody had 
requested one. It very well could have been me. It would 
make sense. 
R 137. at 29-30. 
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The K-9 unit was requested about 18 minutes after the stop. See R 137, at 
25-26, 28-29, 32-34, 62-63. The district court's finding suggests that a tint meter was 
requested within the same time frame. "[B]oth ... were requested shortly after the stop." R 
59-60. However, the officers did not document when the tint meter was requested or who 
requested it. 
Even ifwe assume that both a tint meter and a K-9 unit were requested 
during roughly the same time frame, it is not clear why officers would have waited 18 
minutes to request a tint meter, particularly in light of the fact that they were not busy 
checking the defendant's license, registration, or insurance or running a warrants check. It 
is apparent that they spent some of this time running the defendant's criminal history in an 
attempt to determine if he was a convicted felon. R 137, at 65. 
There is nothing in the record that suggests that, prior to conducting the K-9 
sniff, the officers saw, heard, or smelled anything that would have warranted any 
extension of the traffic stop. Accordingly, the State contends that the officers did not 
extend the traffic stop because they were still waiting for the arrival of a tint meter when 
the K-9 arrived. The tint meter was apparently requested at about the same time that the 
officers called for the K-9 unit,4 some 18 minutes after making the stop. None of this time 
was spent in following traffic stop protocol, but was apparently consumed in concluding 
that the officers were not going to be able to arrest the defendant for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm. 
4At least the district court's findings identify no distinction between the time m 
summoning one as opposed to the other. R 59-60. 
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The task force officers documented everything they did in connection with 
their narcotics investigation but failed to document the one thing they claim to have done 
in the interest of advancing the investigation of the only legitimate reason for initiating the 
stop-the window tint violation. While there is evidence that the K-9 unit was requested 
about 18 minutes after the stop, the record does not establish when a tint meter was 
requested or that one was requested during that time frame. R 137, at 29-30, 69, 96-97, 
1 I 8-119. However, the record clearly establishes that, prior to calling for the K-9 unit, 
none of the task force officers asked the defendant to produce a driver's license, vehicle 
registration, or proof of insurance. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that 
establishes that, prior to calling for the K-9 unit, any of the task force officers did anything 
to clear the traffic stop. R 13 7, at 61-64, 89-92, 98-99, 115-117. 
Although it is apparent that the officers had ample reason to stop defendanf s 
vehicle for a window tint violation, it is obvious that the equipment violation was a pretext 
for initiating the stop. Sergeant Parry seems to concede as much. R 13 7, at 44-45. While 
this fact is not fatal to the State's position, the fact that the drug task force did nothing to 
perpetuate the pretense of a traffic stop after the defendant was detained is problematic. It 
is telling that the officers documented the fact and time of their requesting the K-9 unit 
and the time when the drug sniff was concluded, but did not document the time of the stop 
by contacting the dispatcher, never asked the defendant to produce a driver's license, 
vehicle registration, or proof of insurance, and cannot identify who called for the tint 
meter, when the call was made, or the time the tint meter arrived on scene. 
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If the evidence that the State has produced in support of the warrantless 
search in the instant case is deemed satisfactory, the protection that the Utah Supreme 
Court attempted to preserve when it abolished the pretext stop doctrine in State v. Lopez, 
supra, will be rendered an unenforceable illusion. 
POINT III 
POLICE DID NOT HA VE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
INITIATE A STOP OR EXTEND DEFENDANT'S 
DETENTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING A 
WEAPONS VIOLATION. 
Although the district court limited its analysis to the window tint violation, 
the defendant notes that, in the lower court, the State had also contended that, in addition 
to probable cause to detain the defendant for a traffic violation, the detectives also had 
reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant for the purpose of investigating a 
weapons violation. In the district court. the State argued: 
R 37. 
In this case, the task force received a tip that the defendant 
claimed that he "had guns" and, if stopped by police, would 
·'shoot it out with them.'' This is a highly reliable tip because 
it came from a known, uncompensated, citizen informant. 
This information became highly relevant to the detectives 
when the defendant showed up unexpectedly during 
surveillance of a business property late at night. 
The State went on to argue: 
Even if the Court determines that detectives did not have 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant for a 
weapons violation at the inception of the traffic stop, 
detectives certainly had reasonable suspicion of a weapons 
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R 37-38. 
violation when the defendant admitted there was a firearm in 
the vehicle in response to Detective Nuccitelli's questioning 
during the initial contact. 
This argument is clearly without merit. Defendant's admission that there 
was a firearm in the vehicle did not raise reasonable suspicion of a weapons violation 
because the police did not have a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant was a 
restricted person. Sergeant Parry's knowledge that the defendant had been convicted of a 
felony some years earlier did not establish reasonable suspicion that he was still a 
restricted person. See State v. Houston, 2011 UT App 350, 263 P.3d 1226 (officer 
reasonably relied upon information from state trooper, where trooper had knowledge that 
defendanf s driver license had been revoked until 2012, and therefore had reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant. who the trooper observed driving in November 2008, was 
doing so in violation of the law, particularly, where the trooper, "'just a few days before," 
had "verified in a Driver License Division computer database that [defendant's] license 
was still revoked. 'l 
While Sergeant Parry, at some point in time, had been under the mistaken 
impression that the defendant was a restricted person as a result of a felony conviction, he 
did not suggest that his fellow officers initiate a stop on this basis. R 13 7, at 27-28, 44-45. 
Indeed, Detectives Jessop and Nuccitelli initiated the stop based upon the window tint 
violation. R 137. at 73, 77-78. 
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Even if the stop could somehow be justified on the basis of information that 
the task force had received prior to the evening in question, this information did not 
provide a legal basis for extending the defendant's detention. After the defendant was 
stopped and told Detective Nuccitelli that he had a firearm in his vehicle, the police did 
not arrest him or seize the weapon on the theory that he was a restricted person, apparently 
because by that point in time they knew that the defendant's conviction had been reduced 
or expunged. R 13 7, at 65. At that juncture, there are was no other basis for believing that 
the defendant was a restricted person or that his possession of a firearm was prohibited by 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence that the State offered in support of this warrantless search fails 
to demonstrate that task force officers took any measures to clear the traffic stop before 
embarking upon their narcotics investigation. In the final analysis, the record does not 
demonstrate that officers took any measures to clear the traffic stop before concluding 
their narcotics investigation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of March, 2016. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHANCE ARIC NA VARRO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 131501328 
Judge John J. Walton 
The Court, having considered Defendant's Motion to Suppress and counsels' memoranda 
in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
makes the following findings, conclusions and order: 
The Court finds that the stop of defendant's vehicle for a window tint violation was 
constitutional at its inception. The Court further finds that both a tint meter and a K-9 unit were 
requested shortly after the stop, and that the tint meter did not arrive until after the arrival of the 
K-9 unit. Once the K-9 alerted on the defendant's vehicle, the detectives had reasonable 
suspicion of additional serious criminal activity, and could appropriately expand the investigative 
scope of the initial stop. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the detectives did not act 
unconstitutionally in the initial detention of defendant for an equipment violation, nor did they 
act unconstitutionally in the expanded investigation of defendant for additional serious criminal 
activity. 
The Court therefore denies the defendant's motion to suppress. 
------------------END OF ORDER----------------
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